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Abstract
This paper introduces a differentially private (DP)
mechanism to protect the information exchanged
during the coordination of sequential and inter-
dependent markets. This coordination represents
a classic Stackelberg game and relies on the ex-
change of sensitive information between the system
agents. The paper is motivated by the observation
that the perturbation introduced by traditional DP
mechanisms fundamentally changes the underlying
optimization problem and even leads to unsatisfi-
able instances. To remedy such limitation, the pa-
per introduces the Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg
Mechanism (PPSM), a framework that enforces the
notions of feasibility and fidelity of the privacy-
preserving information to the original problem ob-
jective. PPSM complies with the notion of dif-
ferential privacy and ensures that the outcomes of
the privacy-preserving coordination mechanism are
close-to-optimality for each agent. Experimental
results on several gas and electricity market bench-
marks based on a real case study demonstrate the
effectiveness of the approach.
1 Introduction
The coordination of sequential and interdependent agents
in market-based systems has traditionally been modeled as
a Stackelberg game [Simaan and Cruz, 1973]. While the
coordination among these agents is central to achieve effi-
cient and cost-effective operations, it also requires the ex-
change of proprietary information between the agents in or-
der to achieve an optimal strategy. For instance, in the
context of electricity and gas markets, relevant data may
represent the costs of producers, the loads of consumers,
or technical characteristics of the energy network. As has
been observed in various works (e.g., [Zugno et al., 2013;
Baringo and Conejo, 2013]), such information may be sensi-
tive: It can provide a competitive advantage over other strate-
gic agents in the system, it may induce financial losses, and it
may even benefit external attackers [Maharjan et al., 2013].
˚Authors names listed alphabetically. All authors have equal
contributions.
To address this issue, several privacy-preserving frame-
works have been proposed, with Differential Privacy (DP)
[Dwork et al., 2006] emerging as a robust privacy framework
for many applications. DP allows to measure and bound the
risk associated with an individual participation in an analysis
task. DP algorithms rely on the injection of carefully cali-
brated noise to the output of a computation. They can thus be
used to obfuscate the sensitive data exchanged by the system
agents in the market. However, as shown in Section 7, when
perturbed data are used as input to Stackelberg games, they
may produce results that are fundamentally different from
those obtained on the original data: They often transform the
nature of the underlying optimization problem and even lead
to severe feasibility issues.
This paper is a first step in addressing this challenge. It
introduces the Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism
(PPSM) for the coordination of sequential and interdependent
agents. PPSM is a two-stage protocol that allows the coordi-
nating agents to exchange differentially private data of high
fidelity. In particular, PPSM relies on several learning and
optimization models (including fidelity constraints on the ob-
jectives and coordination variables of the agents) to ensure
that the privacy-preserving information exchanged between
the agents preserves the feasibility and near-optimality of the
original Stackelberg game. PPSM has been analyzed both
theoretically and experimentally. The theoretical guarantees
ensure differential privacy and near optimality, while the ex-
perimental results validate the approach on a real test case
for the coordination of electricity and natural gas markets in
the Northeastern United States [Byeon and Van Hentenryck,
2019]. The case study shows that PPSM can bring up to two
orders of magnitude error reduction over standard privacy-
preserving mechanisms.
Although the paper was motivated by the coordination be-
tween natural gas and electricity markets, the proposed meth-
ods may apply to any type of coordination mechanism be-
tween sequential and interdependent agents where the agents
exchange information and synchronize through price signals.
2 Problem Definition and Privacy Goal
The strategies of two sequential and interdependent agents,
such as energy market operators, represent a classic Stack-
elberg game [Simaan and Cruz, 1973]. In this framework,
which is schematically illustrated in Figure 1, the leader (e.g.,
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Figure 1: Stackelberg game in sequential interdependent markets.
the first market operator) optimizes its decisions while antic-
ipating the reaction of the follower (e.g., the second market
operator). The leader actions impact the reaction of the fol-
lower, which in turn impacts the leader objective value. As a
result, the leader strategy in Stackelberg games can be mod-
eled as a bilevel optimization problem PL `DL, DFP , DFS ˘:
OL˚ “ min
xL,yF
OL
´
xL, DL
¯
(1a)
s.t. pxL,yF q P FLpDLq (1b)
yF“ dual sol. min
xF
OF
´
xF, DFP , D
F
S
¯
(1c)
s.t. pxF,xLq P FF pDFP , DFS q, (1d)
where xL represents the vector of decision variables of
the leader, and xF and yF the vectors of primal and dual
decision variables of the follower. Additionally, DL and
(DFP , D
F
S q are the inputs of the leader and follower prob-
lems, respectively. The follower inputs are either public (DFP )
or sensitive (DFS ). The upper-level problem minimizes the
leader objective cost (1a), constrained by its feasible decision
space FL (1b), and the reaction of the follower in the lower-
level problem (1c) and (1d). The follower problem, denoted
by PF `xL, DFP , DFS ˘, minimizes the follower objective cost
(1c), constrained by the feasible space FF of the follower
decisions (1d).
Coordination Variables: The leader primal variables xL ap-
pear as fixed parameters in the expression of the follower fea-
sible space FF. In return, the lower-level problem provides
feedback from the follower dual variables yF to the upper-
level problem through its feasible space FL. In energy mar-
kets, primal variables typically represent commitment and en-
ergy production decisions, while dual variables represent en-
ergy prices. These variables shared between the follower and
the leader are called coordination variables.
Assumptions: Due to the sequential decision-making nature,
the leader needs to anticipate the reaction of the follower.
Therefore, this paper assumes that the leader has access to a
prediction modelMLpDL, DFP , DFS q that predicts the values
y¯F of the follower dual variables. This is a natural assumption
in energy markets applications that motivates this paper: Such
forecasting models are used in practice since generators must
predict energy prices in order to efficiently bid in the markets
and the market needs to ensure reliability of the overall sys-
tem. Similarly, the follower has access to a forecasting model
MF pxL, DFP , DFS q that predicts its objective value O¯F˚and
the values of its dual variables y¯F
˚
. This is also a natural
assumption in energy markets since the energy prices and
costs, representing the values of the dual variables and ob-
jective cost of the follower problem PF `xL, DFP , DFS ˘, are
released publicly, and thus can be used to train precise es-
timators. The PPSM mechanism in this paper applies these
forecasting models on privacy-preserving versions of the sen-
sitive parameters.
Motivation Problem: Byeon and Van Hentenryck [2019] re-
cently showed that the coordination between electricity and
natural gas markets can be modeled as a Stackelberg game
between a leader, i.e. the gas-aware electricity unit commit-
ment (GAUC), and two followers, i.e. the electricity market
(EM) and natural gas market (GM). This game can alleviate
the reliability issues that emerged in the recent polar vortex
events. In this context, the leader coordination variables rep-
resent the commitment of Gas-Fired Power Plants (GFPPs),
which impacts their participation in both EM and GM. The
relevant follower coordination variables represent natural gas
prices in the GM. These prices impact the GAUC decisions
through coordination constraints representing the profitabil-
ity of the bids of GFPPs.
Privacy Goal: The paper focuses on situations where the fol-
lower inputsDFS contain sensitive information that should not
be revealed. In the case of electricity and natural gas markets,
a FERC directive allows the gas and electricity operators to
share network data, while the bids of the generators are pub-
lic information. Therefore, the sensitive parameters typically
represent the gas demand profile of consumers. As discussed
in the introduction, if released, they can provide a compet-
itive advantage to strategic agents in the energy system and
may result in financial losses for the follower, as shown in
[Zugno et al., 2013; Baringo and Conejo, 2013]. Thus, the
privacy goal is to ensure that the sensitive information DFS
is not breached during the coordination process described in
Problem (1). The next section introduces a formal notion that
will be used to achieve this goal.
3 Background: Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [Dwork et al., 2006] (DP) is a rigor-
ous privacy notion used to protect disclosures of an individ-
ual’s data in a computation. The paper considers datasets
DFS “ pd1, . . . , dnq with each di PR` describing a sensitive
quantity, such as the participants’ demand value in the GM.
DP relies on the notion of dataset adjacency, which captures
the differential information to be protected. To protect the
values in the dataset, the paper uses the following adjacency
relation:
D „α D1 ô Di : |di ´ d1i| ď α^ @j ‰ i : dj “ d1j ,
where D and D1 are two datasets and α is a positive real
value. Such definition is useful to hide individual participa-
tion up to some quantity α [Chatzikokolakis et al., 2013]. In
the paper context, it allows customers to reveal gas demand
profiles that hide the real consumption by a factor of α.
A randomized mechanismM :DÑR with domainD and
range R is -DP if, for any output response O Ď R and any
two adjacent datasets D „α D1 , for a fixed value α ą 0:
PrrMpDq P Os ď exppqPrrMpD1q P Os. (2)
The parameter  ě 0 is the privacy loss of the mechanism,
with values close to 0 denoting strong privacy. The level of
indistinguishability is controlled by the parameter α ą 0.
The definition above was introduced by Chatzikokolakis et
al. [2013]. It is a generalization of the classical DP defini-
tion, that protects individuals participation, to arbitrary met-
ric spaces. W.l.o.g. the paper fixes  “ 1.0 and focuses in the
indistinguishability parameter α. In the context of this work,
Definition (2) is referred to as α-indistinguishability.
An important DP property is immunity to post-processing.
Theorem1 (Post-Processing [Dwork and Roth, 2013])
Let M be an α-indistinguishable mechanism and g be an
arbitrary mapping from the set of possible outputs to an
arbitrary set. Then, g ˝M is α-indistinguishable.
A functionQ (also called query) from a data setD P D to a
result setR Ď Rn can be made differentially private by inject-
ing random noise to its output. The amount of noise depends
on the sensitivity of the query, denoted by ∆Q and defined
as ∆Q “ maxD„D1 }QpDq ´QpD1q}1 . In other words, the
sensitivity of a query is the maximum l1-distance between the
query outputs of any two adjacent datasets D and D1.
4 The PPS Problem
The Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg (PPS) problem estab-
lishes the fundamental desiderata to be delivered by the ob-
fuscation mechanism. It operates on the follower sensitive
parameters DSF exchanged to ensure coordination between
the leader and the follower in the resolution of Problem
(1). The goal is to produce a privacy-preserving version DˆSF
that is α-indistinguishable from DSF and which ensures that
OˆL˚ « OL˚ , where OˆL˚ is the leader objective value in the
Stackelberg game when DSF is replaced by Dˆ
S
F .
5 The PPSM Mechanism
The Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism (PPSM) is
described schematically in Figure 2 and consists of the fol-
lowing steps which will be described in detail subsequently:
• [1] [Follower]: Given the sensitive data DFS , the follower
produces D˜FS which is α-indistinguishable from D
F
S .
• [2a] [Leader]: Given D˜FS and DL, the leader uses model
ML to (privately) estimate the value of the dual coordina-
tion variables y¯F .
• [2b] [Leader]: It then solves the leader problem
PLpDL, y¯Lq with the values of variables yL fixed to y¯L
to obtain the value of the coordination variables x¯L.
• [3a] [Follower]: Given values x¯L and the follower data
pDFP , D˜FS q, the follower uses modelMF to (privately) es-
timate the objective value O¯F˚ and the values for the dual
variables y¯F˚ of the follower problem PF .
• [3b] [Follower]: Finally, using D˜FS and the estimates
computed in [2b] and [3a], the follower produces a new
privacy-preserving vector DˆFS to achieve OˆL
˚ « OL˚ .
Once PPSM produces the privacy-preserving demand DˆFS ,
the leader can clear its market using DˆFS to produce x¯
L˚
which is communicated to the follower for clearing its own
market as depicted in Figure 1.
Coordination Variable Estimation Phase
Original 
sensitive data
Privacy Phase
DFS
Figure 2: PPSM Illustration.
5.1 Privacy Phase
In Step [1], the follower takes as input its sensitive parameters
DFS and constructs a privacy-preserving version D˜
F
S using the
Laplace mechanism [Dwork et al., 2006].
Theorem2 (Laplace Mechanism) Let Q be a numeric
query that maps datasets to Rn. The Laplace mechanism that
outputs QpDq ` ξ, where ξ P Rn is drawn from the Laplace
distribution Lapp∆Q{qn, achieves α-indistinguishability.
In the above, Lappλqn denotes the i.i.d. Laplace distribution
with 0 mean and scale λ over n dimensions. As a result, the
privacy-preserving parameters D˜FS are obtained as follows:
D˜FS “ DFS ` Lappαqn. (3)
Importantly, the Laplace mechanism has been shown to be
optimal, i.e., it minimizes the mean-squared error for identity
queries w.r.t. the L1-norm [Koufogiannis et al., 2015].
While (3) ensures α-indistinguishability, the obfuscated
data may not achieve strong fidelity with respect to the orig-
inal problem. Crucially, in energy systems, the inputs gen-
erated by this mechanism often fail to produce a feasible so-
lution to the problem of interest, as highlighted in Section
7. To remedy this limitation, the proposed PPSM introduces
an optimization-based approach that aims at producing a new
privacy-preserving dataset DˆFS establishing fidelity with re-
spect to the constraints and objectives of the leader and fol-
lower problems.
5.2 Estimating the Coordination Variables
After having received the Laplace-obfuscated data D˜FS from
the follower, the leader uses modelMLpDL, DFP , D˜FS q to es-
timate the value of the coordination variables yF of the fol-
lower (Step [2a]). Next, in Step [2b], the leader solves the
optimization problem
x¯L “ arg min
xL
OL `xL, DL˘ s.t. pxL, y¯F q P FLpDLq. (4)
Problem (4) describes, in fact, the leader subproblem (Equa-
tions (1a) and (1b)), in which the values of variables yF have
been fixed to the estimates y¯F .
The leader then communicates the estimates x¯L to the fol-
lower. In turn, the follower uses model MF px¯L, DFP , D˜FS q
to estimate the values of its subproblem objective value O¯F˚
and dual variables y¯F
˚
(Step [3a]).
5.3 Fidelity Phase
Finally, given the obfuscated parameters D˜FS , computed in
Step [1], the estimated values x¯L, computed in Step [2b], and
the follower objective value O¯F˚ and dual variables y¯F˚ ,
computed in Step [3a], the follower executes the following
bilevel optimization problem:
min
DˆFS ,xˆ
F ,yˆF
}DˆFS ´ D˜FS }22 (5a)
s.t. |OˆF ´ O¯F˚ | ď ηp (5b)
|yˆF ´ y¯F˚ | ď ηd (5c)
yˆF “ dual sol. of PF px¯L,DFP ,DˆFS q, (5d)
where ηp and ηd are parameters specifying the desired fidelity
for the value of the objective and dual variables of the fol-
lower. Its objective is to find new values DˆFS that minimize
the distance to the Laplace-obfuscated D˜FS (5a), while ensur-
ing (component-wise) fidelity with respect to the estimated
objective value O¯F˚ (5b) and dual variables y¯F˚ (5c). The
follower objective function OˆF and dual variables yˆF are de-
fined as the solutions to the lower-level problem (5d), which
represents the follower subproblem PF px¯L, DFP , DˆFS q with
the new sensitive parameters DˆFS and the values of the coor-
dination variables xL fixed to the estimates x¯L. Additionally,
this lower-level problem (5d) enforces feasibility of the fol-
lower problem with respect to the estimates x¯L.
Using the equivalent Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) con-
ditions of the linear lower-level problem (5d) and the
Fortuny-Amat linearization, this bilevel problem can be re-
cast as a mixed-integer second-order cone program (MIS-
OCP) [Gabriel et al., 2012].
Theorem3 For given positive real α, PPSM satisfies α-
indistinguishability.
Proof. The privacy phase of PPSM (Step [1]) produces a gas
demand profile D˜FS using the Laplace mechanism with pa-
rameter λ “ α (Equation (3)). By Theorem 2, the resulting
demand profile satisfies α-indistinguishability. Notice that
Steps [2a]–[3b] take as input the privacy-preserving gas pro-
files D˜FS generated during the privacy phase, and uses exclu-
sively the public information—e.g., the problem model and
the historical data. Therefore, by the post-processing immu-
nity property of differential privacy (Theorem 1) the output
DˆFS of the fidelity phase satisfies α-indistinguishability. l
6 Error Analysis
This section analyzes the impact of the data perturbation in-
duced by PPSM on the optimal objective value of both agents
in the privacy-preserving problem. The results below hold
under the assumption that the estimated values x¯L, O¯F˚ , and
y¯F
˚
are accurate.
Theorem4 (Error) After the fidelity phase, the expected er-
ror induced by PPSM on the original, sensitive, parameters
DFS is bounded by the inequality:
Er}DˆF˚S ´DFS }s ď 4α2,
where DˆF
˚
S is the solution to Problem (5).
Proof. Denote with D˜FS “ DFS ` Lappαq the privacy-
preserving version of the gas demand profile obtained by the
Laplace mechanism. We have that:
}DˆF˚S ´DFS }2 ď }DˆF
˚
S ´ D˜FS }2 ` }D˜FS ´DFS }2
ď 2}D˜FS ´DFS }2 ď 4α2.
The first inequality follows from the triangle inequality on
norms. The second inequality follows from:
}DˆF˚S ´ D˜FS }2 ď }D˜FS ´DFS }2
by optimality of xDˆF˚S , xˆ˚y and the fact that xDFS ,x˚y is a
feasible solution to constraints (5b) to (5d) (Problem 5), or,
similarly, by optimality of xDˆF˚s , xˆ˚, yˆ˚y and the fact thatxDFS ,x˚,y˚y is a feasible solution to constraints (5b) to (5d)
(Problem 5). The third inequality follows directly from the
variance of the Laplace distribution. l
The next theorem bounds the difference in objective value
for the leader problem when the leader problem is convex and
the coordination constraints are linear.
Theorem5 (Cost of privacy) Consider a convex leader
problem whose coordination constraints (6c) are linear;
OˆL˚ “ min
xL,yF
OL `xL, DL˘ (6a)
s.t. xL P FL `DL˘ (6b)
AxL `ByF ě b (6c)
yF “ dual sol. of PF pxL,DFP ,DˆFS q, (6d)
where PF pxL,DFP ,DˆFS q uses the privacy-perserving DˆFS .
After the fidelity phase, the error induced by PPSM on the
objective value OˆL˚ of the leader problem (6) is bounded by
the inequality:
}OˆL˚ ´OL˚} ď ηd}BT yL˚}1, (7)
where yL
˚
denotes the dual variables values associated
with the constraints (6c) of the original leader problem
PLpDL, DFP , DFS q.
Proof. Equation (5c) enforces fidelity w.r.t. the dual co-
ordination variables values y¯F
˚
, as estimated in step [3a].
Therefore, the upper- and lower-level variables of the DP
leader problem (6), denoted PLpDL, DFP , hatDFS q, can be
defined as the perturbed variables: yF “ y¯F˚ ` ηd and
xL “ xL˚ ` δxL; where, xL˚ are the solutions to the leader
problem PLpDL, DFP , DFS q with original sensitive parame-
ters DFS , and the variables  P U such that U Ă RJ “tr1, . . . , J s | ´1 ď j ď 1, @j P t1, . . . , Juu (J is the di-
mensionality of the dual variables yF )).
As a result, with a change of variables in Problem (6), the
difference between the objective value OˆL˚ of the DP leader
problem PLpDL, DFP , DˆFS q and the objective value OL˚ of
the original leader problem PLpDL, DFP , DFS q can be ex-
pressed as the optimal objective value of the following per-
turbed leader problem:
OˆL˚ ´OL˚ “ min
δxL,
OL `δxL, DL˘ (8a)
s.t xL
˚ ` δxL P FL `DL˘ (8b)
AδxL `Bηd ě b´AxL˚ ´By¯F˚ (8c)
y¯F
˚ ` ηd “ dual sol. of PF pxL, DFP , DˆFS q (8d)
problem (1c)´ (1d) (8e)
In this perturbed problem, the coordination constraints (6c),
are perturbed by the term ηd.
We define the following function f :  P U ÞÑ f pq P R,
as the optimal objective value of the following (parametric)
optimization problem:
f pq “ min
δxL
OL `δxL, DL˘ (9a)
s.t xL
˚ ` δxL P FL `DL˘ (9b)
AδxL `Bηd ě b´AxL˚ ´By¯F˚ , (9c)
@ P U . (9d)
The bounds of this function over the set  P U will provide
bounds to the objective value of the perturbed Problem (8).
For any  P U , f pq is upper-bounded by the optimal objec-
tive value of the following problem:
min
δxL
OL `δxL, DL˘ (10a)
s.t xL
˚ ` δxL P FL `DL˘ (10b)
Kÿ
k“1
AiKδx
L
k `min
PU
Jÿ
j“1
Bijηdj
ě bi ´
Kÿ
k“1
Aikx
L˚
k ´
Jÿ
j“1
Bij y¯
F˚
j , @i P t1, ..., Iu.
(10c)
Note that, represents a worst-case scenario of the perturbed
coordination constraints (6c).
The solutions to the inner minimization in equation (6) is
´řJj“1 |Bij |ηd. Therefore, in the worst-case leader problem
(10), the right-hand side of each coordination constraint (9)
is perturbed by this small amount ´řJj“1 |Bij |ηd. The im-
pact of this small perturbation on the leader objective value isř
ij |BijyL
˚
i |ηd, where yL˚i is the optimal dual variable asso-
ciated with each coordination constraint of the leader problem
with the coordination variables yF fixed to the values y¯F
˚
. If
the estimates y¯F
˚
are accurate, this also represents the dual
variables of the leader problem PLpDL, DFP , DFS q with the
original sensitive data DFS .
By analogy, we can straightforwardly deduce that a lower-
bound to fpq is given by ´řij |BijyL˚i |ηd. Therefore,
|fpq| (and the cost of privacy) are bounded as follows:ˇˇˇ
θˆL
˚ ´ θL˚
ˇˇˇ
ď ηd
ˇˇˇˇˇˇ
BT yL
˚ ˇˇˇˇˇˇ
1
. (11)
l
While fidelity with respect to the follower objective value
is explicitly enforced by Constraint (5b), the result above en-
sures fidelity with respect to the leader objective value. This
fidelity is implicitly enforced by Constraint (5c) on the fol-
lower coordination variables yF , and their impact on the
leader objective value via the coordination constraints (6c).
This sub-optimality in the leader cost represents the so-called
cost of privacy.
7 Experimental Evaluation
The performance of the proposed PPSM is illustrated on the
motivation problem introduced in Section 2. The leader rep-
resents the GAUC problem, and the two followers represent
the EM and GM problems. The PPSM aims at preserving
privacy on the sensitive gas demand profiles (DgS) in the GM,
and fidelity with respect to the original Stackelberg game. Fi-
delity constraints are explicitly enforced on the original objec-
tive value of the GM pOg˚q and gas prices pyg˚q. Addition-
ally, the implicit impact of the PPSM on the original objective
values of the GAUC (Ouc˚ ) and the EM (Oe˚ ) is analyzed.
Case study setup. The PPSM is evaluated on a test system
that represents the joint natural gas and electricity systems
in the Northeastern US [Byeon and Van Hentenryck, 2019].
The system is composed of the IEEE 36-bus power system
[Allen et al., 2008] and a gas transmission network cover-
ing the Pennsylvania-to-northeast New England area. An in-
depth description of the GAUC problem and case-study setup
will be provided upon request.
This case study analyzes the performance of PPSM under
various operating conditions of the gas and electricity sys-
tems. The electricity demand profile is uniformly increased
by a stress factor ranging from 30% to 60%, and the gas
demand profile is increased by a stress factor ranging from
10% to 130%, producing increasingly stressed and difficult
operating conditions. The experiments compare the proposed
PPSM to a version (PPSMp) that omits the fidelity constraint
on the dual variables (5c). Both versions are compared with
the standard Laplace mechanism for varying values of the
privacy parameter α P t0.1, 1, 10u ˆ 102 MWh, and the fi-
delity parameters ηp “ ηd P t0.01, 0.1, 10.0u% of the orig-
inal objective value of the GM pOg˚q and gas prices pyg˚q,
respectively. In the GAUC problem, the original, sensitive,
gas demand vector is denoted DgS (in lieu of D
F
S ). Notice
that, in the highest stress factor adopted, this demand vector
has minimum, median, and maximum values: 0, 3.38 ˆ 102,
98.31 ˆ 102, respectively. Therefore, the privacy parameters
adopted ensure a very low privacy risk.
To induce uncertainty on the gas cost estimates y¯g (in lieu
of y¯F ), the experiments use a noisy version resulted by per-
turbing the original estimates yg˚ using Normal noise with
standard deviation equal to 10% of the average value of yg˚.
The experiments also evaluated benchmarks that use precise
cost estimates. The results trends are consistent with those
provided here.
We generate 30 repetitions for each test case and report
average results in all experiments and impose a 1-hour wall-
clock limit. A wall-clock limit of 1 hour is given to generate
and solve each of the instances. The resolution of the privacy-
preserving demand profiles (phases [1] and [2] of PPSM)
takes less than 30s for any of the instances.
M α sat.(%) ∆DgS (L1) ∆Oucp%q ∆Oep%q ∆Og p%q
Laplace
0.1 71.49 5.08 0.1237 0.3222 0.3335
1.0 18.13 50.85 1.2959 3.5538 3.5540
10.0 4.47 508.55 22.940 52.414 52.414
PPSMp
0.1 98.45 4.45 0.0631 0.1503 0.1503
1.0 91.30 21.87 0.1216 0.1764 0.1761
10.0 80.71 24.31 0.2143 0.3851 0.3853
PPSM
0.1 99.10 3.89 0.0192 0.1056 0.1057
1.0 95.09 12.71 0.0698 0.1465 0.1465
10.0 91.35 14.16 0.1367 0.2330 0.2331
Table 1: Left: Satisfactory instances (%) and L1 errors (MWh) on
the gas demands (∆Dg
S
) for varying indistinguishability parameters
α, and ηp “ ηd “ 0.1% of the leaders objective value and the
dual variables values, respectively. Right: Errors (%) on the leader
objective (∆Ouc ) and followers’ objectives (∆Oe and ∆Og ).
Limits of The Laplace Mechanism
This section studies the applicability of the Laplace mecha-
nism to our context of interest. Table 1 (left) reports the per-
centage of the feasible solutions (over 1260 instances) across
different values of the privacy parameter α. It compares the
Laplace mechanism with PPSMp and PPSM. When α ą 0.1
the Laplace-obfuscated gas demands rarely produce a feasible
solution to the GAUC problem. These results justify the need
for more advanced privacy-preserving mechanisms for Stack-
elberg games, and hence the proposed PPSM. In contrast, the
PPSMs result in a much higher number of feasible solutions.
Indeed, all “unsolved” PPSM cases are due to timeout and
not as a direct result of infeasibility. Additionally, we verified
that the two PPSMs are always able to find a feasible solution
to the GM follower problem with the gas demand profile DˆgS .
Table 1 (left) also reports the L1 distance ∆d between the
original gas demand DgS and the privacy-preserving versions
obtained with each of the mechanisms analyzed. Unsurpris-
ingly, the L1 errors increase with the increasing of parameter
α, as larger values of α induce more noise. However, the L1
errors introduced by the PPSM are much more contained than
the Laplace ones, producing more than an order of magnitude
more accurate results for the larger privacy parameters. These
results indicate that the highly-perturbed demand profiles in-
duced by the Laplace mechanism lead to infeasibility in the
GAUC problem, whereas both PPSM and PPSMp manage to
restore feasibility of the post-processed demand profiles.
Leader and Follower Objectives
The next results evaluate the ability of PPSM to preserve the
optimal objective values of the leader and the follower prob-
lems. Table 1 (right) tabulates the errors, in percentage, on
the objective costs of the GAUC problem (leader), the EM
problem and the GM problem (followers) at varying indis-
tinguishability parameters α, and for a fixed fidelity param-
eter η “ ηp “ ηd “ 0.1%. The errors ∆O are defined
as |O
˚´O˜˚|
O %, where O P tOuc,Oe,Ogu and are computed
in expectation over the feasible instances only. Parameter α
controls the amount of noise being added to the gas demand
profiles, therefore, the objective costs are closer to their orig-
inal values when α is small. Observe that the PPSMs induce
objective costs differences that are from one to two orders of
magnitude more accurate than those induced by the Laplace
mechanism, and that are at most 0.4% of the original objec-
M η ∆Oucp%q ∆Oep%q ∆Og p%q
Laplace NA 22.9400 52.4141 52.4141
PPSMp
0.1% 0.1915 0.3851 0.3851
1.0% 0.1946 0.4102 0.4102
10.0% 0.2224 0.4543 0.4543
PPSM
0.1% 0.1367 0.2330 0.2330
1.0% 0.1242 0.2060 0.2060
10.0% 0.2086 0.3601 0.3605
Table 2: Cost objective differences (%) at varying fidelity parame-
ters η “ ηp “ ηd %, and indistinguishability parameter α “ 10.
tive costs. Additionally, PPSM is consistently more accurate
than PPSMp; By enforcing fidelity of the coordination vari-
ables yg , PPSM better limits the impact of the noise on the
leader objective (GAUC), which in turn results in more faith-
ful solutions for the followers’ problems.
These results are further illustrated in Table 2, that analyzes
the difference in objective costs at varying fidelity parameters
ηp and ηd, for a fixed privacy parameter α “ 10 (i.e., the
largest privacy level attainable in our experimental setting).
Once again, the results of the PPSM mechanisms are at least
two orders of magnitude more precise than those obtained by
the Laplace mechanism. Additionally, notice that the fidelity
parameters ηp and ηd impact the accuracy of the privacy-
preserving objective costs. Indeed, they indirectly control
the deviation of the privacy-preserving GAUC and GM ob-
jectives with respect to the original counterparts. While the
results differences are small, in percentage, their impact on
the objective functions (in the 106 order) is non-negligible.
Stress Levels Analysis
Finally, this subsection details the effect of the privacy-
preserving mechanisms on the combined GAUC problem for
all the electricity and gas stress levels adopted.
Figure 3 reports heatmaps of the total (GAUC) objec-
tive cost difference, in percentage, at varying electricity (e)
and gas (g) stress levels for the privacy-preserving data ob-
tained via the Laplace mechanism (top), PPSMp (middle),
and PPSM (bottom). Each square represents the objective
cost difference averaged over 30 instances for a particular
electricity and gas stress level. The darker the color, the more
pronounced are the errors committed by the mechanisms, as
reported in the legends on top of each subfigure. Gray squares
represent the set of instances for which no feasible solution of
the GAUC problem was found or when a timeout is reached.
The illustration reports the cost differences for privacy pa-
rameters α“0.1 (left) α“1.0 (middle), and α“10.0 (right).
These results illustrate three trends: Firstly, for every
mechanism, the objective differences become more pro-
nounced as the electricity and gas stress levels increase. This
can be explained by the increased impact of the Laplace per-
turbations on higher values of gas demand profiles. Secondly,
they remark that the PPSMs produce privacy-preserving
Stackelberg problems that are consistently more faithful to
the original problems with respect to those produced by the
Laplace mechanism. Finally, they show that PPSM is con-
sistently more accurate than PPSMp across all stress levels.
These results are significant, as they show the robustness of
the proposed PPSMs over different electricity and natural gas
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Figure 3: GAUC objective cost difference (%) at varying gas (g) and electricity (e) stress levels for D˜gS obtained via Laplace (top), PPSMp
(middle), PPSM (bottom). Privacy: α“0.1 (left), 1.0 (center), 10.0 (right). Fidelity: ηp“ηd“0.1% of respective quantities.
demand profiles. They indicate that PPSM can provide a re-
alistic and efficient solution for the coordination of electricity
and natural gas markets.
8 Related Work
The obfuscation of data values under the lens of differential
privacy is a challenging task that has been studied from sev-
eral angles. Often, the released data is generated from a data
synopsis in the form of a noisy histogram [Li et al., 2010; Hay
et al., 2016; Qardaji et al., 2014; Mohammed et al., 2011;
Xiao et al., 2010]. These methods are typically adopted in
the context of statistical queries. The design of markets for
private data has also received considerable attention, see for
instance [Ghosh and Roth, 2010; Niu et al., 2018].
However, all the proposals above, do not involve data used
as input to a complex optimization problem, as in the case of
this work. The closest work related to the proposal in this pa-
per can be considered [Fioretto and Van Hentenryck, 2018;
Fioretto et al., 2019a], which, in the context energy net-
works, propose a privacy-preserving mechanism for releasing
datasets that can be used as input to an optimal power flow
problem. A similar line of work uses hierarchical (bilevel)
optimization for obfuscating the energy network parameters
or locations while ensuring high utility for the problem of in-
terest [Fioretto et al., 2019a; Fioretto et al., 2019b].
In contrast to these studies, the proposed PPSM focuses on
solving Stackelberg games in which the follower parameters
are sensitive. PPSM also enforces the notion of fidelity of the
privacy-preserving information with respect to the leader and
follower objectives. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this
is the first DP mechanism that is applied to the coordination
of sequential electricity and natural gas markets.
9 Conclusions
This paper introduced a differentially private (DP) mecha-
nism to protect the sensitive information exchanged during
the coordination of the sequential electricity and natural gas
market clearings. The proposed Privacy-Preserving Stackel-
berg Mechanism (PPSM) obfuscates the gas demand profile
exchanged by the gas market, while also ensuring that the re-
sulting problem preserves the fundamental properties of the
original Stackelberg game. The PPSM was shown to enjoy
strong properties: It complies with the notion of DP and en-
sures that the outcomes of the privacy-preserving Stackelberg
mechanism are close-to-optimality for each agent. Experi-
mental results on several gas and electricity market bench-
marks based on a real case study demonstrated the effective-
ness of the approach: The PPSM was shown to obtain up
to two orders of magnitude improvement on the cost of the
agents when compared to a traditional Laplace mechanism.
Future work will focus on several avenues, including ex-
tended theoretical bounds on the cost of privacy, studying the
game-theoretic properties of this privacy-preserving Stackel-
berg game, accounting for uncertainty on the public data, and,
studying the applicability of the PPSM to other domains.
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A Gas-aware Electricity Unit Commitment
Problem
This section reviews the motivating application used in the
paper.
Due to the large penetration of Gas-Fired Power Plants
(GFPPs) at the interface between electricity and natural gas
systems, the operation of these energy systems is strongly in-
terdependent. Yet, electricity and natural gas systems are op-
erated in the day-ahead by sequential and independent mar-
kets. This lack of coordination may lead to significant eco-
nomic inefficiencies and reliability risks in congested envi-
ronments, as revealed by the 2014 polar vortex event in the
northeastern United States.
In order to improve the coordination between these systems
while preserving the current organization of their respective
markets, [Byeon and Van Hentenryck, 2019] proposed to in-
troduce gas network awareness into the current unit commit-
ment problem. In this work, the coordination between elec-
tricity and natural gas markets is modeled as a Stackelberg
game between a leader, i.e. the gas-aware electricity unit
commitment (GAUC), and two followers, i.e. the electricity
market (EM) and natural gas market (GM).
GAUC Coordination Variables (xuc)
The GAUC is responsible for committing the bids of the elec-
tricity market participants, while anticipating the impact of
these decisions on the follower, i.e. the sequential EM and
GM clearings. Due to the participation of GFPPs at the inter-
face between electricity and natural gas systems, the commit-
ment xuc of the selected bids of GFPPs by the GAUC impacts
both the EM and GM clearings.
Firstly, the EM uses the bids commitment xuc of the EM
participants as input and dispatches these selected bids to
maximize the social welfare of the power system. Secondly,
the GM dispatches its participants bids in order to maximize
the social welfare in the natural gas system.
EM and GM Coordination Variables (xe and yg)
The electricity dispatch xeof GFPPs is directly linked to their
gas consumption γg, which is used as input to the GM clear-
ing problem. In return, the reaction of the follower, i.e., the
electricity dispatch xe and gas prices yg , are accounted in the
leader decisions through the objective cost Ouc and feasible
space of the GAUC problem Fuc.
Firstly, the GAUC problem objective accounts for the dis-
patch cost of the electricity bids dispatched xe. Secondly,
the GAUC problem feasible space accounts for bid-validity
constraints which embed the interdependencies between the
gas prices yg and the marginal electricity production cost of
GFPPs. In practice, these linear coordination constraints en-
force the price of the last selected GFPPs bid to be no larger
than their marginal electricity production cost. These bidirec-
tional interdependencies between the leader and the follower
are characteristic of a classic Stackelberg game.
Note that, while, in this motivation problem, both the pri-
mal and dual coordination variables of the followers impact
the leader problem, solely the dual variables yg of the fol-
lower with sensitive data (GM) impact the leader feasible
space. Therefore, this problem structure directly relates to
the general Stackelberg game presented in the paper.
GAUC Problem
Therefore, the compact formulation of the GAUC as a hierar-
chical optimization problem is as follows:
Puc “ min
xucPt0,1uN
xe,ygě0
Ouc “ cucJxuc ` ceJxe (12a)
s.t. xuc P Fuc (12b)
Aucxuc `Bucyg ě buc (12c)
xe,yg P primal and dual sol. of (13),
(12d)
where N is the dimensionality of the commitment vector.
The leader objective aims at minimizing the electricity sys-
tem operating cost, which includes no-load and start-up costs
cuc
J
xuc, and the cost of dispatching the electricity bids ce
J
xe,
constrained by the techno-economic characteristics of elec-
tricity suppliers (12b), and the bid-validity constraints (12c).
EM and GM Problems
Furthermore, due to the sequential order of EM and GM
clearings, the two follower problems (12d) can be expressed
as a single hierarchical optimization problem, such that:
Pe “ min
xe,yg
Oe “ ceJxe (13a)
s.t. xe P Fe (13b)
Aexe `Bexuc ě be (13c)
yg P dual sol. of Pg “ min
xg
Og “ cgJxg
(5a)
s.t. xg P Fg (5b)
Agxg `Bgxe “ dg.
(5c)
The objective (13a) of the middle-level problem is to min-
imize the electricity dispatch cost, constrained by linearized
power flow constraints (13b) and bounds on the selected bids
xuc of electricity suppliers (13c). The lower-level problem
(5a)–(5c) represents the GM clearing, which seeks to mini-
mize the natural gas dispatch cost (5a), constrained by lin-
earized gas flow constraints and the bounds on natural gas
supply and demand bids (5b), as well as the nodal gas bal-
ance equation (5c).
The detailed expressions of these optimization problems,
as well as the matricesAuc,Buc,Ae,Be,Ag ,Bg , the vectors
cuc, buc, ce, be, cg , dg , and the polytopes Fuc, Fe, Fg is
derived from [Byeon and Van Hentenryck, 2019].
Public and Sensitive Information
The GAUC problem takes as input the public techno-
economic characteristics of electricity suppliers, which are
represented in Problem (12) by the matrices Auc and Buc,
the vectors cuc and buc, and the polytope Fuc. As the GAUC
and EM cover the same energy system, these two agents also
take the same parameters as input, which include the price
ce and quantity be bids of electricity suppliers, electricity de-
mand profile, and electricity network technical characteris-
tics. These parameters are represented in Problem (13) by the
matrices Ae and Be, the vectors ce and be, and the polytope
Fe.
Moreover, the GAUC takes as input the parameters of
the the GM follower, which include the public price cg and
quantity bids of gas suppliers, gas network technical char-
acteristics, as well as sensitive gas demand profiles, denoted
DgS . These parameters are represented in Problem (13) by
the matrices Ag and Bg , the vectors cg and DFS , and the
polytope Fg . In particular, the gas demand profiles DgS ““
dgj : @j P V
‰
at all nodes j P V of the gas network, represent
the sensitive information (referred to as DFS in Problem (1))
of the GM follower.
In contrast, the following outcomes of the GM clearing are
traditionally considered publicly available information: the
original objective value Og˚ and natural gas prices yg˚ . The
mechanism introduced next will leverage this public informa-
tion to train the predictorMF (step [3a]) of the PPSM.
